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Hybrid Federalism and the  
Employee Right to Disconnect 
Paul M. Secunda* 
Abstract 
 
The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) ad-
ministers specific workplace and health standards that generally and ex-
pressly preempt the entire field of workplace safety and health law.  However, 
where such federal OSHA standards do not exist or states have developed 
their own approved OSHA plans, OSHA does not merely set a regulatory floor 
either.  A type of “hybrid federalism” has been established, meaning a strong 
federal-based field preemption approach to labor and employment law issues, 
but tied to a conflict preemption approach.  Applying this hybrid preemption 
approach to the employee right to disconnect problem provides the best op-
portunity to address the growing epidemic of overwork through electronic 
communications in the United States.  
 This hybrid approach has two essential characteristics under OSHA.  
First, as a default standard, a federal general duty clause that requires all 
covered employers to maintain a workplace free of hazards that may cause 
serious injury or death and cannot be feasibly abated.  Second, OSHA also 
has promulgated specific workplace safety and health standard over the last 
five decades that set more detailed and specific requirements for numerous 
health or safety dangers in the workplace.  The specific standards occupy the 
field and all contrary state or local safety and health regulations are 
preempted.  Yet, employers can still seek a permanent variance from any 
OSHA standard if they can establish that they have another method to achieve 
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Law School.  Georgetown Law School, J.D.; Harvard College, A.B.  I would like to thank my research 
assistant, Alicia Ratajczak, Marquette University Law School Class of 2020, for her excellent research 
and writing assistance on this Article.  I very much appreciate Professor Victoria Schwartz and the 
Pepperdine Law Review for inviting this contribution as part of the Federalism: Past, Present, and 
Future Symposium on March 23, 2018. 
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the same goal as the permanent standard.  Second, the OSHAct also permits 
states to develop their own plans and submit them for approval to OSHA.  
Twenty-seven states have taken advantage of this option to one degree or an-
other and have plans approved by OSHA.  While these state-approved plans 
must be “at least as effective” as the federal OSHAct, some states, like Cali-
fornia and Virginia, have been more aggressive in regulation and have regu-
lated areas that the federal OSHAct has not.  This Article maintains that a 
combination of general duty clause federal enforcement and individual state 
enforcement is the most effective way of providing a broad-based right to dis-
connect standard until a federal permanent OSHA standard can be promul-
gated. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Employees in the United States have reached the point where many of 
them have become essentially perpetual “on-call” employees.1  Texting, social 
media, and email all make employees reachable, and assumed available, any-
time, anywhere.2  The line between an employee’s work life and personal life 
have become blurred to the point that this “on-call” culture seems normal; 
technology such as smart phones and laptops makes it impossible for employ-
ees to truly disconnect from the workplace.3  In the United States, many em-
ployers and employees seem to value work over personal hobbies, family, and 
rest.4  Not only does this overwork lead to less time spent caring for children 
and family and less time taking vacation or relaxing,5 but it also leads to work-
place injuries and illnesses caused by fatigue and stress.6  More specifically, 
overwork causes employees to take more time off work, and increases costs 
for employers in the form of lower productivity rates and higher health care 
costs.7 
A recent and noteworthy example of this dysfunctional dynamic comes 
from working conditions at electric car-maker, Tesla, and its hard-driving 
 
 1. An on-call employee is one who historically wore an electronic paging device or “beeper” 
during her off-duty hours and could be called back at employment to perform some task (usually one 
of some urgency).  See, e.g., Bright v. Hous. Nw. Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671, 678–79 (5th 
Cir. 1991) (en banc) (finding time emergency room hospital technician spent wearing beeper 24/7 
without backup not “compensable time” under Fair Labor Standards Act). 
 2. See Jeffrey Pfeffer, Dying for a Paycheck 122–23 (2018); see also Jon Messenger Et Al., 
Working Anytime, Anywhere: The Effects on the World of Work 3–4 (2017).  
 3. See generally Paul M. Secunda, The Employee Right to Disconnect, 9 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 1, 1–7 (2019) (setting forth anecdotes and statistics establishing the inescapable nature of 
modern-day work). 
 4. See Elizabeth Bruenig, America is Obsessed with the Virtue of Work.  What About the Virtue 
of Rest?, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/america-is-ob-
sessed-with-the-virtue-of-work-what-about-the-virtue-of-rest/2018/04/25/f829f406-48bf-11e8-8b5a-
3b1697adcc2a_story.html (“There’s a balance to be struck where it comes to work and rest, but in the 
United States, values and laws are already slanted drastically in favor of work.”). 
 5. Id. (“And in the United States, neither parental leave nor retirement nor vacation is a sure thing: 
In 2016, for instance, more than half of workers left vacation days unused, either unable to afford time 
off or unwilling to risk disappointing their employers.”). 
 6. See Long Work Hours, Extended or Irregular Shifts, and Worker Fatigue, OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/workerfatigue/hazards.html (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2019) [hereinafter OSHA] (“Fatigue can cause weariness, sleepiness, irritability, reduced 
alertness, impaired decision making, and lack of motivation, concentration and memory.”). 
 7. Id. 
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CEO, Elon Musk.8  According to news reports, Musk was working approxi-
mately one-hundred and twenty-hour week, with his last week-long vacation 
being in 2001 due to illness.9  According to The New York Times, Musk stated 
that he would not leave the factory for three to four days at a time, which 
meant he did not see his family or engage in any type of leisure activity or 
rest.10  Musk’s exhausting work life required him to take Ambien, a well-
known sleep aid used now by millions of Americans,11 or risk not sleeping at 
all.12 
Being an employee at Tesla seems to be just as bad, if not worse, than 
being the CEO.13  Employees are pressured to meet production goals, which, 
in turn, requires working up to twelve-hour days, six days per week.14  As a 
result of this overwork, ambulances have been called for Tesla employees 
more than one-hundred times in four years.15  It is not uncommon for employ-
ees to experience dizziness, chest pains, and other ailments, with some even 
passing out on the production floor, while the company expects other employ-
ees to continue work as if nothing happened.16  This type of workplace is like 
indentured servitude in that all employees have the time to do is work and 
sleep; no time exists for family or leisure activities.17  As recently as 
 
 8. See David Gelles et al., Elon Musk Details ‘Excruciating’ Personal Toll of Tesla Turmoil, NY 
TIMES (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/16/business/elon-musk-interview-tesla. 
html. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.; see also Nina Burleigh, Ambien Nation, HUFFPOST LIFE, https://www.huffpost.com/en-
try/ambien-nation_b_43573 (last updated Nov. 17, 2011) (“According to the New York Times, more 
than 25 million prescriptions for Ambien were written last year.  Added to the dozen or so other com-
monly used sleep aids, doctors dashed off almost 50 million prescriptions for sleeping pills in 2006.”). 
 12. See Gelles et al., supra note 8. 
 13. See Julia Carrie Wong, Tesla Factory Employees Describe Grueling Work Conditions Where 
People Pass Out ‘Like a Pancake,’ BUSINESS INSIDER (May 18, 2017, 9:53 AM), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/tesla-factory-workers-detail-grueling-conditions-fremont-2017-5. 
 14. See Julia Carrie Wong, Tesla Workers Say They Pay the Price for Elon Musk’s Big Promises, 
THE GUARDIAN (June 14, 2018, 2:29 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jun/13/ 
tesla-workers-pay-price-elon-musk-failed-promises (“The army veteran put it another way: ‘This 
company is pumping in aluminum, and the main export is injuries, not cars.’”). 
 15. Wong, supra note 13. 
 16. Id.; see also Monica Torres, This is What Happens to Your Body When You Hate Your Job, 
HUFFPOST LIFE, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hate-your-job-body-symptoms_n_5c40a314e4b0a 
8dbe16e8373 (last updated Jan. 29, 2019) (discussing Pfeffer’s work and commenting, “[w]hen you 
see the workplace as a danger zone, it keeps your muscles wound tight, according to the American 
Psychological Association”). 
 17. See PFEFFER, supra note 2, at 122–23. 
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September 2018, California’s Division of Occupational Safety and Health 
(CalOSHA) initiated two health and safety investigations into Tesla based on 
injury reports, while other investigations remain open.18  Of course, in the face 
of the Tesla example, it is hard not to conclude that the long-hours, fast-pace, 
and demands of the Tesla workplace, and many similar U.S. workplaces, is 
directly related to both the number of employee injuries and the number of 
dissatisfied employees.19 
Serving to magnify demanding and dangerous workplaces like Tesla’s are 
the use of smartphones and other workplace technology that allows employers 
to routinely contact employee at all times of the day,20 including in the middle 
of the night.21  Employers use this technology, expecting employees to re-
spond immediately, or at least, promptly.22  Additionally, workers who want 
to appear dedicated and ambitious answer the text messages and emails after 
hours, even though they may not be formally compelled to respond or get paid 
 
 18. See Mark Matousek, California Regulators Opened 2 New Investigations into the Safety of 
Tesla’s Factory in September, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 14, 2018, 3:20 PM), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/tesla-hit-with-new-osha-investigations-for-safety-conditions-2018-9. 
 19. See Wong, supra note 13.  With regard to employee dissatisfaction with Tesla workplace con-
ditions, it is not surprising that there is an on-going unionization campaign seeking to organize workers 
against these brutal and harmful work conditions.  See Wong, supra note 14.  Equally unsurprising is 
that Tesla is fighting the union drive tooth-and-nail and such unhealthy workplaces are more likely to 
occur in a non-unionized environment where employees have little or no voice over their working 
conditions and occupational safety and health matters are not part of a formal bargaining process.  See 
Michael Sainato, Tesla Workers Speak Out: ‘Anything pro-union is shut down really fast,’ THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2018, 9:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/sep/10/tesla -
workers-union-elon-musk. 
 20. See Jena McGregor, Elon Musk is the ‘Poster Boy’ of a Culture that Celebrates ‘Obsessive 
Overwork,’ WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/08/22/ 
elon-musk-is-poster-boy-culture-that-celebrates-obsessive-overwork/; see also Secunda, supra note 3, 
at 1 (describing obsessive overwork leading to premature death in other countries). 
 21. See Genevieve Douglas, That 1 A.M. Cell Phone Call to a Worker May Require Overtime Pay, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.bna.com/ am-cell-phone-n57982095716/ (“Mobile 
devices let employers reach workers 24/7, to the point some may expect their people to respond any-
time day or night.  But that access may come at a price: requiring employers to shell out [overtime] or 
face potential class litigation over unpaid wages or other costs.”).  Of course, such overtime require-
ments would only apply to non-exempt, mostly hourly employees, which is why a wage and hour 
approach to the right to disconnect problem alone is inadequate to this larger workplace dynamic.  See 
Secunda, supra note 3, at 24 (“The answer appears to be that the FLSA does little to tamp down the 
excessive amounts of work that such workplace connectivity increasingly causes.  For exempt em-
ployees, they can literally be forced to double their work hours without labor cost to their employers.”). 
 22. See Press Release, Challenger, Gray & Christmas, Inc., Are You a Digital Dictator? 1 (2017), 
https://www.challengergray.com/press/press-releases/are-you-digital-dictator (noting employers can 
now easily contact employees with workplace concerns outside of regular working period on plat-
forms, such as text messaging, e-mail, and social media). 
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for such responses.23 
Despite these grueling tails of obsessive work in the United States, there 
is no law presently that provides U.S. employees with a “right to disconnect”24 
from repetitive and abusive requests for additional work through text, emails 
and other messages after the work day has formally ended.25  The Tesla ex-
ample, and others discussed in previous articles, establish that a U.S. right to 
disconnect law is badly needed for the U.S. workplace.26  In a previous article, 
I proposed a distinctively American version of a right to disconnect law based 
on fundamental notions of workplace safety and health under OSHA.27  But 
any such proposal to a workplace problem leaves unanswered an important, 
related question: what level of government (federal v. state v. local) should 
legislate, and then, exclusively or in tandem?28 
The United States Constitution sets up a system of federalism whereby 
federal laws are supreme over state laws,29 and gives rise to what is known as 
federal preemption.30  At the same time, the U.S. federal government is one 
of limited constitutional powers because it only has the powers enumerated in 
the Constitution,31 while the remaining powers are reserved for the states and 
 
 23. See McGregor, supra note 20; Challenger, supra note 22. 
 24. The “right to disconnect” loosely refers to a “focus on the safety and health objectives of pro-
tecting employees from overwork by significantly minimizing electronic communication requests af-
ter work.”  See Secunda, supra note 3, at 5.  
 25. See Secunda, supra note 3, at 32 (noting lack of right to disconnect laws in the United States, 
and more specifically, that, “[t]here are currently no enacted or proposed regulations under the OSH 
Act, which address the scope or timing of workplace related electronic communications between em-
ployers and employees”). 
 26. See Gelles et al., supra note 8. 
 27. See Secunda, supra note 3, at 5 (“After considering some of the more pertinent characteristics 
of the American workplace, this Article embraces a tactical choice to focus on the safety and health 
objectives of protecting employees from overwork by significantly minimizing electronic communi-
cation requests after work.”). 
 28. See WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (5th ed. 2011) (discuss-
ing one theme of the casebook as “focusing on determining the best level of government to regulate a 
particular problem”). 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof . . . or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing 
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 30. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990). 
 31. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 533–34 (2012) (“In our federal sys-
tem, the National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain the 
remainder.  Nearly two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall observed that ‘the question respecting 
the extent of the powers actually granted’ to the Federal Government ‘is perpetually arising, and will 
probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.’” (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
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people.32  These constitutional provisions allow Congress to pass laws under 
one of its enumerated powers and then such federal laws either expressly or 
impliedly preempt state legislatures from passing laws on that topic or that are 
in conflict with those laws.33 
Currently, preemption exists in the field of labor and employment law in 
a number of different forms.34  While a detailed analysis of labor and employ-
ment law preemption doctrines is beyond the scope of this article,35 laws like 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)36 preempt or occupy 
the field of employee benefits law, leaving little to no room for states to enact 
legislation in that area.37  Other laws, like the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA),38 set the floor below which state laws may not fall.39  One easy illus-
tration of this principle involves the federal minimum wage.  The FLSA cur-
rently sets the minimum wage at $7.25 per hour,40 leaving states or munici-
palities (as long as permitted by state law) to set the minimum wage level 
higher if they wish, and a good many have.41 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) administers 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act).42  OSHA specific work-
place and health standards expressly preempt the entire field of workplace 
safety and health law,43 but where such standards do not exist or states 
 
U.S. 316, 405 (1819))). 
 32. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amends. IX, X. 
 33. See English, 496 U.S. at 79 (“[S]tate law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts 
with federal law.  Thus, the Court has found pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to 
comply with both state and federal requirements, . . .”). 
 34. For an overview of labor and employment law preemption, see generally Paul M. Secunda, 
Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation to Address Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in 
the United States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 209 (2008); Daniel V. Dorris, Fair Labor Standards 
Act Preemption of State Wage-and-Hour Law Claims, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251 (2009); Gary Minda, 
Employment Law, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 491 (1991). 
 35. See Secunda, supra note 34. 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. (2018). 
 37. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (“ERISA civil enforcement 
mechanism is one . . . provision[] with such ‘extraordinary pre-emptive power’ . . . .”). 
 38. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. (2018). 
 39. See, e.g., Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1425 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he 
purpose behind the FLSA is to establish a national floor under which wage protections cannot drop  
. . . .”). 
 40. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C). 
 41. See Minimum Wage Laws in the States, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/whd/min-
wage/america.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). 
 42. 29 U.S.C. § 656 (2018). 
 43. See Indus. Truck Ass’n, v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The Supreme Court 
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developed their own OSHA plans, it does not set a floor, and there is no 
preemption.44  A type of “hybrid federalism” has been established.  Here, by 
“modified” or “hybrid” federalism, this article refers to a strong federal-based 
field preemption approach to labor and employment law issues, that is tied to 
a conflict preemption approach.  Applying this hybrid preemption approach 
to the employee right to disconnect problem provides the best opportunity to 
address the growing epidemic of overwork through electronic communica-
tions in the United States. 
This hybrid approach has two essential characteristics under OSHA.  
First, as a default standard, a federal general duty clause that requires all cov-
ered employers to maintain a workplace free of hazards that may cause serious 
injury or death and cannot be feasibly abated.45  Second, OSHA also has 
promulgated specific workplace safety and health standards over the last five 
decades that set more detailed and specific requirements for numerous health 
or safety dangers in the workplace.46  The specific standards occupy the field 
and all contrary state or local safety and health regulations are preempted.47  
Yet, employers can still seek a permanent variance from any OSHA standard 
if they can establish that they have another method to achieve the same goal 
as the permanent standard.48  Second, the OSH Act also permits states to de-
velop their own plans and submit them for approval to OSHA.49  Twenty-
seven states have taken advantage of this option to one degree or another and 
have plans approved by OSHA.50  While these state-approved plans must be 
“at least as effective”51 as the federal OSH Act, some states, like California 
and Virginia, have been more aggressive in regulation and have regulated 
 
has held that the Occupational Safety and Health Act expresses Congress’ clear and manifest intent to 
preempt state law.” (citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992))). 
 44. See infra Part IV. 
 45. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2018). 
 46. Id.  If a permanent or interim OSHA standard applies, the General Duty clause does not. 
 47. See Indus. Truck Ass’n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1311 (1997) (“[U]nder the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, as interpreted by Gade, when OSHA promulgates a federal standard, that stand-
ard totally occupies the field within the ‘issue’ of that regulation and preempts all state occupational 
safety and health laws relating to that issue, conflicting or not, unless they are included in the state 
plan.”). 
 48. 29 U.S.C. § 655(d) (2018). 
 49. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 667(b)–(c). 
 50. See, e.g., Contact a State Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/in-
dex.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). 
 51. 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2).  
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areas that the federal OSH Act has not.52  This Article maintains that a com-
bination of general duty clause federal enforcement and individual state en-
forcement is the most effective way of providing a broad-based right to dis-
connect standard until a federal permanent standard can be promulgated. 
This Article discusses the importance of using OSHA’s unique brand of 
hybrid federalism to address the employee right to disconnect problem in four 
parts.  Part II gives a brief overview of federalism and preemption in the 
United States.53  Part III discusses the role preemption has played historically 
within different types of labor, employment, and employee benefit law 
schemes.54  Part IV explains preemption in the OSHA context and examines 
OSHA-approved state plans.55  Finally, Part V recommends a hybrid federal-
ism approach to the right to disconnect problem in the United States, relying 
initially on the federal general duty clause and on regulatory innovations pos-
sible under pre-approved state OSHA plans.56 
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERALISM AND PREEMPTION 
Federalism and preemption stem from the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution, which says that the Constitution and laws passed 
by the federal government are the supreme laws of the land.57  Additionally, 
the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution states that any power not expressly 
granted to the federal government is reserved to the States.58  Thus, when fed-
eral and state law conflict, federal law supersedes state law to the extent that 
Congress has the enumerated power to regulate that area.59  While this is eas-
ily understood, it is not easily applied; preemption law is murky.60  To further 
clarify this area of the law, preemption in this Part is broken down into the 
 
 52. See FACT SHEET, COMPARISON OF CAL/OSHA AND FEDERAL OSHA PROGRAMS, CAL. DEP’T 
OF INDUS. REL., https://www.dir.ca.gov/Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2019); Virginia State 
Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/stateprogs/virginia.html (last visited Mar. 
1, 2019). 
 53. See infra Part II. 
 54. See infra Part III. 
 55. See infra Part IV. 
 56. See infra Part V. 
 57. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 58. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 59. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 533–34 (2012). 
 60. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232–33 (2000); Secunda, supra note 34, at 
230 n.122. 
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following categories: (1) express preemption and (2) implied preemption, 
which can be further categorized into (A) field preemption and (B) conflict 
preemption.61 
A. Express Preemption 
Express preemption exists when Congress includes a section in legislation 
that withholds law-making authority from the states on that topic.62  One ex-
ample of express preemption is found in the Airline Deregulation Act,63 which 
says, “a State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision 
having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air 
carrier that may provide air transportation.”64  This statute provides an exam-
ple of an express preemption provision that demonstrates Congress’ broad 
purpose and intent to prohibit states from regulating in this area of the law.65  
Because of this broad express exemption, a New York statute that required 
airlines to provide passengers with food, water, electricity, and restrooms after 
they boarded the plane was preempted by the federal law because it related to 
a service provided by an air carrier.66  Relatedly, in a similar case, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a Texas statute that regulated advertising of airline 
fares was preempted by the same law.67  Analogizing to ERISA, the Court 
found the state statute preempted because it related to prices of an air carrier.68 
 
 61. See Nelson, supra note 60, at 232–33.  It is important to note that these categories are not rigid 
and tend to seep into one another as the ensuing discussion on this topic suggests.  See Indus. Truck 
Ass’n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Although these categories provide a useful 
analytic framework, they are not ‘rigidly distinct.’  Field preemption, for instance, ‘may be understood 
as a species of conflict pre-emption: A state law that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with 
Congress’ intent (either express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulations.’  It is, however, a 
more potent species, for under field preemption the state regulation is preempted whether or not it 
actually conflicts with the federal scheme.” (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co, 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 
(1990))). 
 62. See Nelson, supra note 60, at 232–33. 
 63. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq. (2015). 
 64. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). 
 65. See EagleMed LLC v. Cox, 868 F.3d 893, 899 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 66. See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 222 (2nd Cir. 2008). 
 67. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388 (1992). 
 68. Id. 
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B. Implied Field Preemption 
In many statutes, express preemption language is absent.69  In such cases, 
a court must ascertain whether Congress intended the law to preempt state 
laws impliedly.70  Congress may intend for the federal government to exclu-
sively occupy the field to which the law relates.71  Such “field preemption” 
may be inferred by looking at the scheme of the law and whether it is “so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for 
the States to supplement it.”72 
One area in which Congress has occupied the field leaving no room for 
states to regulate is immigration.73  Congress created a complete system for 
immigrant registration so that when a state made it a misdemeanor for an un-
documented individual not to register as the federal law required, the U.S. 
Supreme Court found that the federal law preempted the state law due to Con-
gress’ intent.74  Even though the state law in question furthered the same pur-
pose as the federal law and was generally consistent with the federal law, the 
Court still said it was preempted because Congress intended to occupy the 
entire field of law surrounding immigrant registration.75  According to the 
Court, allowing states to enforce penalties in this area would frustrate “the 
federal government’s control over enforcement.”76 
C. Implied Conflict Preemption 
Alternatively, if Congress did not intend to occupy the field, it may still 
impliedly preempt state law by intending to preempt state laws that conflict 
 
 69. See, e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 80 (1990) (finding it “undisputed” that Con-
gress had not expressly preempted state law by enacting several statutes for the nuclear industry). 
 70. Id. at 78–79. 
 71. Id. at 79. 
 72. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 73. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395, 401 (2012) (noting that federal law 
governing immigration is “extensive and complex,” and more specifically, “the Federal Government 
has occupied the field of alien registration.”); see also Thomas O. McGarity, Trumping State Regula-
tors and Juries, PROSPECT (Apr. 14, 2017), https://prospect.org/article/trumping-state-regulators-and-
juries-0 (“Thus, for example, the federal immigration laws preempt all state laws addressing immigra-
tion into the United States of persons from other countries.”). 
 74. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 400–01. 
 75. Id. at 400–02. 
 76. See id. at 401–02 (quoting Wisconsin Dep’t of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, 
Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 288 (1986)). 
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with the federal law.77  Conflict preemption comes in two forms: obstacle and 
impossibility.78  Obstacle preemption exists “where state law ‘stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress.’”79  For a state law to be obstacle-preempted by federal law, 
the conflict must be “so direct and positive that the two acts cannot be recon-
ciled or consistently stand together.”80  As a way of illustration, a state law 
claim for mislabeling baby formula as organic was obstacle-preempted by the 
federal Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA).81  The state law claim struck 
“at the very heart” of the OFPA certification process because it alleged that 
the formula was not actually organic even though it received the organic cer-
tification.82  This type of scenario is the reason Congress passed the OFPA so 
that a state law claim could not be entertained.83 
Alternatively, impossibility preemption exists when complying with both 
state and federal law is impossible; in these cases, federal law preempts state 
law.84  Courts must address whether the party may independently do under 
federal law what the state law requires.85  For example, the Court held that a 
federal law preempted a state law requiring more information to be disclosed 
on a generic drug label.86  The federal law required generic drugs to have the 
same labels as brand-name drug labels.87  Because it was impossible for the 
manufacturer of the drug to fulfill the requirements of the state law without 
violating federal law, the Court found the state law preempted.88 
III. FEDERALISM AND PREEMPTION IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Preemption exists in labor and employment law just as it does in the other 
areas of law.  Express, implied field preemption, and implied conflict preemp-
tion are all part of this area of labor and employment law and statutes to 
 
 77. See Nelson, supra note 60, at 227–28; English, 496 U.S. at 79. 
 78. See Nelson, supra note 60, at 227–28. 
 79. See English, 496 U.S. at 79 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 80. E.g., Marentette v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 886 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 81. Id. at 118. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 119. 
 84. See English, 496 U.S. at 79. 
 85. See Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 907 F.3d 701, 709–10 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 86. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 618 (2011). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
[Vol. 46: 873, 2019] Hybrid Federalism and the Employee Right to Disconnect 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
886 
varying degrees.  To illustrate the various types of preemption in this area of 
the law, this Part examines the preemption framework of the ERISA89 as pri-
marily an example of express preemption,90 while the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) provides an example of both implied field preemption and 
implied conflict preemption.91 
A. Express Preemption 
In ERISA, Congress expressly preempted state laws “relating to” em-
ployee benefits by including a provision that says that the ERISA “shall su-
persede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to 
any employee benefit plan.”92  This express preemption has been interpreted 
very broadly.93  However, a state law may nevertheless be saved from ERISA 
preemption if it regulates insurance, securities, or banking under the savings 
clause.94  Finally, even if the state law regulates insurance, it may still be 
preempted under the deemer clause if it is being applied to a self-insured 
health plan.95 
Based on this express statutory language, early preemption cases under 
Section 514 of ERISA applied a broad preemption approach.96  For instance, 
 
 89. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2018). 
 90. To be clear, Section 502(a) of ERISA also provides forms of both implied field and conflict 
preemption as well.  See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004).  However, these topics 
are not discussed in this Part, and ERISA is presented here only to give an example of express preemp-
tion in labor and employment law. 
 91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2018). 
 92. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2018).  Under the original numbering of this legislation, this section is 
normally referred to as ERISA § 514(a).  “ERISA is a complex statute covering an extensive area of 
law.  It ‘protects employee pensions and other benefits by providing insurance . . . , specifying certain 
plan characteristics in detail . . . , and by setting forth certain general fiduciary duties applicable to the 
management of both pension and nonpension benefits plans.’”  Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: 
Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 136 (2009) (quoting Varity 
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996)).  
 93. See Secunda, supra note 92. 
 94. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A). 
 95. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B). 
 96. So-called “[m]odern preemption cases appear to abandon the broader field preemption ap-
proach in favor of a conflict preemption approach under which a state law is preempted only to the 
extent that it is impossible to comply with both ERISA and state law or where the state law interferes 
with the purposes and objectives of ERISA.”  RICHARD A. BALES ET AL., UNDERSTANDING 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 223 (2007).  See generally Secunda, supra note 92, at 139–43, for a discussion of 
these modern preemption cases.  The seminal modern preemption case is N.Y. State Conference of 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). 
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in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,97 three employers provided ERISA-covered 
medical plans to their employees.98  Of significance, these plans failed to pro-
vide benefits to pregnant employees as mandated by New York state laws.99  
In deciding whether the New York laws were preempted by ERISA, the Court 
interpreted the “related to” language in Section 514(a) to mean that a state law 
is preempted if it makes “reference to” or has a “connection with” an ERISA 
plan.100  The Court concluded that the New York laws requiring pregnancy 
coverage had a connection with employee benefit laws because the New York 
laws mandated what the plans had to cover.101 
Later cases clarified the scope of the meaning of “connected with” an 
employee benefit plan and thus, preemption by ERISA.102  In Pilot Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Dedeaux,103 Dedeaux injured his back while working for his em-
ployer.104  He was covered under a long-term disability insurance plan cov-
ered by ERISA, and although he initially received coverage for his back 
ailment, the benefits were terminated by Pilot Life after two years.105  There-
after, Dedeaux’s benefits were terminated and reinstated a number of times, 
and Dedeaux sought to bring a number of common-law bad faith insurance 
claims under Mississippi state law.106  The Court held that state tort and con-
tracts claims alleging improper processing of a benefits claim were preempted 
by ERISA because the state law claims were “connected with” the administra-
tion of an ERISA plan.107  More specifically, the Court concluded that the 
“roots” of Dedeaux’s claims were grounded in state tort and contract law and 
not subject to ERISA’s savings clause which provides an exception for state 
laws regulating insurance.108 
 
 97. 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
 98. Id. at 92. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 96–97. 
 101. Id. at 108. 
 102. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985). 
 103. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).  Pilot Life now stands for the broader proposition that state common law 
claims having a connection with an employee benefit plan are preempted.  See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. 
v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004). 
 104. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 43. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 47. 
 108. Id. at 50. 
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B. Implied Preemption 
As opposed to the express preemption provisions of ERISA, the NLRA109 
is an example of implied preemption, specifically both impossibility-conflict 
(conflict) preemption and field preemption.  Within the field of NLRA law, 
the Supreme Court has developed three preemption doctrines: (1) Garmon 
preemption; (2) Machinists preemption; and (3) Section 301 preemption.110 
The Supreme Court held in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar-
mon111 that the NLRA preempts state laws that Section 7 protects or arguably 
protects or that Section 8 prohibits or arguably prohibits.112  The use of the 
word “arguably” underscores the breadth of Garmon preemption.113  In other 
words, it does not matter whether one is considering a specific law that deals 
with labor relations or just a rule of general application that only incidentally 
touches on labor relations.114  This is very much a conflict preemption doctrine 
based on the idea that it is impossible for parties to abide by both federal and 
state law in a given area.115  Indeed, this is exactly what happened in Garmon 
itself when the Court concluded that California state courts lacked jurisdiction 
to intervene in a picketing dispute between the parties.116 
Another line of labor preemption law cases exists under Lodge 76, Inter-
national Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Commission.117  Machinists preemption does provide employers 
 
 109. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2018). 
 110. See Secunda, supra note 34, at 232. 
 111. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
 112. Secunda, supra note 34, at 232, 245.  “Garmon preemption arises when there is an actual or 
potential conflict between state regulation and federal labor law due to state regulation of activity that 
is actually or arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA.”  See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. 
Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Chamber of Commerce of 
U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008). 
 113. See Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Un-
ionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 378 (1990) (“Garmon’s ‘arguably protected’ rule imposes greater 
restrictions on state courts with respect to labor disputes: so long as the assertion of NLRA protection 
is not frivolous, the state court is without authority to proceed, even though ultimately the NLRB might 
determine that the challenged conduct is not federally protected.”). 
 114. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244 (“Nor has it mattered whether the States have acted through laws 
of broad general application rather than laws specifically directed towards the governance of industrial 
relations.  Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow the states to control conduct which is the subject 
of national regulation would create potential frustration of national purposes.”). 
 115. Id. at 246. 
 116. Id. 
 117. 427 U.S. 132 (1976). 
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with protection from state law even though employers do not enjoy express 
rights under the NLRA.118  In Machinists, the Court held that the scheme of 
the NLRA implicitly left open the availability of economic force to the parties 
as a way to resolve labor stalemates.119  State law is preempted when it inter-
feres with lawful economic pressure applied by either party.120  In many re-
spects, Machinists preemption has proven to be just as broad as Garmon 
preemption.121 
Finally, Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (or Taft-
Hartley Amendments of 1947) concerns disputes arising under existing col-
lective bargaining agreements and allows enforcement of their terms in fed-
eral court.122  Although it appears to apply only to jurisdiction, “it has been 
interpreted as authorizing federal courts to fashion a body of common law for 
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements” in order to promote uni-
formity in this area of labor law.123  In addition to conferring subject matter 
jurisdiction, Section 301 also directs the district courts to develop a federal 
common law of labor agreements.124  Any state law that is inconsistent with 
federal common law under Section 301 is deemed preempted.125  Section 301 
preemption is therefore a form of field preemption in which Congress has 
chosen to completely occupy the field of federal labor law concerning the in-
terpretation of collective bargaining agreements.126  Interestingly, then, the 
NLRA is an example of a law that contains doctrines that cover both implied 
field preemption (Section 301), as well as implied conflict preemption (Gar-
mon and Machinists doctrines). 
 
 118. See Gottesman, supra note 113, at 380 (“The Machinists doctrine depends upon a startling 
supposition for those familiar with the climate that spawned the Wagner Act: that Congress intended, 
in passing that Act, to ‘protect’ employers from state law disarmament.”). 
 119. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140. 
 120. Id. at 143–44. 
 121. See Gottesman, supra note 113, at 381. 
 122. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2018). 
 123. See Antol v. Esposto, 100 F.3d 1111, 1115 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Textile Workers Union of 
Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957)). 
 124. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985); see also Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 
456–57. 
 125. See Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 209; Local 174, Teamsters, Chaukfeurs, Warehousemen & 
Helpers of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102–03 (1962); Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456–57. 
 126. See Teamsters, 369 U.S. at 102–03. 
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IV. HYBRID FEDERALISM AND OSHA PREEMPTION 
OSHA provides perhaps the most complicated overall approach to 
preemption based on its statutory structure.  On the one hand, OSHA adopts 
express field preemption: “[t]he Supreme Court has held that the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act expresses Congress’ clear and manifest intent to 
preempt state law.”127  Moreover, “[a]ll state regulations relating to the ‘issue’ 
of a federal standard are preempted even if they do not conflict with the federal 
scheme.”128  Yet, in addition to this express preemption, OSHA also contains 
elements of implied field preemption and implied conflict preemption.  As 
described in The Employee Right to Disconnect: “OSHA is legislation with 
some default prohibitions, such as the General Duty Clause129 . . . but . . . it 
allows for employers to meet safety and health standards through creating 
equally effective ones of their own, often called permanent variances.”130  Ad-
ditionally, OSHA allows states to run their own state plans if approved by 
OSHA and have at least as generous coverage.131  In this sense, a type of hy-
brid or modified federalism has been established that allows federal law to 
expressly preempt state law through its general duty clause provisions or 
through a health and safety standard promulgated under the Act.132  At the 
same time, forms of implied preemption are permitted by either allowing em-
ployers through permanent variances to circumnavigate federal OSHA stand-
ards or permit states through pre-approved OSHA plans to cooperate in 
 
 127. See Indus. Truck Ass’n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Gade v. Nat’l 
Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992)). 
 128. Henry, 125 F.3d at 1310 (citing Gade, 505 U.S. at 103).  That being said, OSHA’s preemptive 
effect does have limits.  For instance, prosecutions under general state criminal law will normally not 
be preempted.  See People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962, 965–66 (Ill. 1989). 
 129. OSH Act of 1970 § 5(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2006) (“Each employer shall furnish to 
each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards 
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.”).  The General 
Duty Clause only applies when a safety or health standard is not already on point.  See SeaWorld of 
Fla., LLC v. Perez, 748 F.3d 1202, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Susan Harthill, The Need For a Revitalized 
Regulatory Scheme to Address Workplace Bullying in the United States: Harnessing the Federal Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1250, 1268–70 (2010). 
 130. Secunda, supra note 3, at 6; see also 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(6)(C) (2018) (permanent variance 
standard). 
 131. 29 U.S.C. §§ 667(c)(2), 672 (2018).  See Secunda, supra note 3, at 16 (“States are also permit-
ted to create their own occupational health and safety plans, as long as such plans do not provide 
protections lesser than federal floor and provide coverage for state and local employees.”). 
 132. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 103 (1992). 
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policing workplace safety and health issues.133 
To more fully understand this hybrid federalism dynamic, this Part dis-
cusses in detail the four essential characteristics of hybrid federalism under 
OSHA: (1) the federal default standard, known as the general duty clause; (2) 
promulgated specific safety and health standards under OSHA; (3) employer 
permanent variance from federal OSHA standards; and (4) pre-approved state 
OSHA plans.  Each of these aspects will be discussed in turn. 
A. The General Duty Clause 
First, as a default standard, the general duty clause of the federal OSHA 
statute requires all covered employers to maintain a workplace free of hazards 
that may cause serious injury or death and that cannot otherwise be feasibly 
abated.134  For instance, in F & H Coatings, LLC v. Acosta,135 a 12,000-pound 
sandblasting vessel elevated on pipe racks fell and crushed an employee to 
death.136  In such cases where no extant safety or health standard is on point, 
OSHA has the burden of establishing a violation of the general duty clause.137  
The elements that OSHA must prove include: “(1) that the employer failed to 
render its workplace free of an obvious and recognized hazard, (2) the hazard 
was causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm, and (3) there 
was a feasible method by which the employer could have abated the haz-
ard.”138 
In F&H Coatings, the court explained that “[a] safety hazard at the 
worksite is a condition that creates or contributes to an increased risk that an 
event causing death or serious bodily harm to employees will occur.”139  Sig-
nificantly, proximate cause is not required,140 and a condition is a hazard if it 
 
 133.  See Secunda, supra note 3, at 15–16. 
 134. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2018). 
 135. 900 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 136. Id. at 1218. 
 137. Id. at 1224. 
 138. Id. (quoting Safeway, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 382 F.3d 1189, 
1195 (10th Cir. 2004)).  Successful general duty clause claims can also be said to contain four ele-
ments, which are summarized as follows: (1) the employer failed to furnish a workplace free of a 
hazard, and its employees were exposed to that hazard; (2) the hazard was recognized; (3) the hazard 
was causing, or was likely to cause, death or serious physical harm; and (4) a feasible method existed 
to correct the hazard.  See Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265–67 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 139. 900 F.3d at 1224–25. 
 140. Id. at 1225. 
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is “‘recognized’ either by the employer or by the industry, or was so obvious 
as to put the employer on constructive notice.”141  That being said, a hazard 
must be preventable to support a violation of a general duty claim and the 
clause does not impose strict liability on an employer.142 
Where there was a feasible method to abate the hazard, the court in F&H 
Coatings agreed that using rollers to support the vessel would have been one 
feasible means of abating the hazard.143  Taking all these factors into consid-
eration, the court found OSHA proved a violation of the general duty clause 
because the “likelihood of the vessel falling was exacerbated by the uneven 
weight of the protruding manway, and [by] the placement of the vessel” which 
constituted a hazard and created a risk of death or serious bodily harm.144 
An understanding of the general duty clause’s operation still requires an 
understanding of its preemptive effect in a given safety or health workplace 
situation.145  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit explained in Gen-
eral Dynamics Land Systems that, “section 5(a)(1) [the general duty clause] 
can no more be denied legal effect on the basis of OSHA’s preemption regu-
lations than it can on the basis of its specific standard.”146  Indeed, if an extant 
safety or health standard does not provide the necessary and effective response 
to a workplace safety or health issue, the general duty clause comes into play 
to provide that protection.147  In this sense, the general duty clause applies 
even when there is a standard if the standard is ineffective.148  OSHA “does 
not . . . absolve employers who observe specific standards from duties other-
wise imposed on them by the general duty clause.”149 
 
 141. Id. at 1226. 
 142. See Nat’l Realty, 489 F.2d at 1268. 
 143. 900 F.3d at 1229. 
 144. Id. at 1225. 
 145. See Randy S. Rabinowitz & Mark M. Hager, Designing Health and Safety: Workplace Hazard 
Regulation in the United States and Canada, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 373, 376–77 (2000) (“Congress 
further limits OSHA’s coverage through its appropriations power.  Since the 1970s, Congress has 
banned routine inspections of employers with fewer than ten employees or enforcement of the [OSH] 
Act on small farms without temporary labor camps.”). 
 146. See Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen. Dy-
namics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570, 1577 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 147. Id. at 1579 (“[T]he larger point [is] that when an employer is aware of a hazard that is not in 
fact addressed by a specific standard, then of necessity that standard cannot be deemed to have 
preempted his obligation under the general duty clause.”). 
 148. Id. at 1577 (“In sum, if an employer knows that a specific standard will not protect his workers 
against a particular hazard, his duty under section 5(a)(1) will not be discharged no matter how faith-
fully he observes that standard.  Scienter is the key.”). 
 149. Id. at 1576. 
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B. Specific OSHA Safety and Health Standards 
If OSHA has promulgated interim or workplace safety and health stand-
ards on point, normally the general duty clause, with the ineffectiveness ex-
ception noted above, is not applicable.150  As far as standards, which number 
in the thousand, they set out more detailed and specific requirements for nu-
merous health or safety dangers in the workplace.151  In Section 6(b), OSHA 
sets out procedures for promulgation of such standards, which include: an in-
terested party proposing a rule; announcement of the rule in the Federal Reg-
ister; comments on the proposed rule; review of the rule by the Office of Man-
agement and Budget; promulgation of rule; and review by a federal court of 
appeals and, perhaps even, the U.S. Supreme Court.152  These specific stand-
ards expressly occupy the field when they apply and all contrary state or local 
safety and health regulations are expressly preempted.153 
Consider the Hazard Communication Standard discussed in Industrial 
Truck Ass’n. v. Henry.154  There, California enacted Proposition 65 in 1986, 
the California Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act, and its im-
plementing regulations.155  Proposition 65 requires the State to publish and 
maintain a list of chemicals known to cause cancer, birth defects or other re-
productive harm, among other things.156  The issue presented to the court was 
“whether California may enforce these regulations against manufacturers of 
industrial trucks under the authority of that portion of the state regulations 
which the state did not incorporate into the state plan it submitted to the federal 
 
 150. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (2018); Gen. Dynamics, 815 F.2d at 1576; Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co. 
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 489 F.2d 1257, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 151. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (“[T]he Secretary shall . . . promulgate as an occupational safety or health 
standard any national consensus standard, and any established Federal standard, unless he determines 
that the promulgation of such a standard would not result in improved safety or health for specifically 
designated employees.”).  See JEFFREY M. HIRSCH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 236 
(2d ed. 2013) (“Permanent standards were intended to be the Secretary’s primary means of enforcing 
the OSHAct.  The procedures required to promulgate a permanent standard are, like the procedures to 
promulgate other formal administrative rules, extensive.”). 
 152. See HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 151, at 236. 
 153. See Indus. Truck Ass’n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[U]nder the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, as interpreted by Gade, when OSHA promulgates a federal standard, 
that standard totally occupies the field within the ‘issue’ of that regulation and preempts all state oc-
cupational safety and health laws relating to that issue, conflicting or not, unless they are included in 
the state plan.”). 
 154. Id. 
 155. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§ 25249.5–25249.14 (2017) (“Proposition 65”). 
 156. Id. § 25249.8. 
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[OSHA].”157  After a comprehensive and detailed analysis, the court held “that 
the parts of the state regulations not submitted to OSHA, insofar as they apply 
to industrial trucks, are preempted under . . . OSHA’s Hazard Communication 
Standard.”158  This outcome derives from the fact that the state plan preemp-
tion provision, OSHA §18(b), “‘unquestionably’ pre-empts any state law or 
regulation that establishes an occupational health and safety standard on an 
issue for which OSHA has already promulgated a standard,” and where the 
State has not obtained OSHA’s approval for its own plan.159  The problem for 
California was that it was not clear at all that these standards were part of 
California’s OSHA plan.160  More specifically, the court found that the Hazard 
Communication Standard, enacted by OSHA to protect workers from hazard-
ous chemicals in the workplace, was appropriately promulgated under 
OSHA’s standard-making authority and not contained in the state pre-ap-
proved plan.161 
To be clear, if no pre-approved State plan existed at all, that would have 
been the end of the analysis and OSHA would have expressly preempted the 
state law.162  This is because “[t]he scope of preemption in each area in which 
a federal standard has been promulgated is complete.  All state regulations 
relating to the ‘issue’ of a federal standard are preempted even if they do not 
conflict with the federal scheme.”163  In other words, “[f]ederal [OSHA] 
standards, like the Hazard Communication Standard, preempt more than those 
state standards directly covering the same ‘issue’ as the federal standard; ra-




 157. Henry, 125 F.3d at 1306. 
 158. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200). 
 159. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 97 (1992). 
 160. Henry, 125 F.3d at 1306. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1310 (“In Gade, the plurality interpreted § 18 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 667, and held that 
unless a state plan is submitted to OSHA, ‘the OSH Act pre-empts all state occupational safety and 
health standards relating to any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal 
standard has been promulgated.’” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Gade, 505 U.S. at 102)). 
 163. Henry, 125 F.3d at 1310. 
 164. Id. at 1314. 
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C. Variances to Permanent Standards 
Yet, employers can still seek a permanent variance from any OSHA 
standard if they can establish that they have another method to achieve the 
same goal as the permanent standard.165  Under Section 655(d) of OSHA: 
“Any affected employer may apply to the Secretary for a rule or order for a 
variance from a standard promulgated under this section.”166 
An employer may request two types of variances: temporary or perma-
nent.167  OSHA will grant a temporary variance only where the employer es-
tablishes that: (1) it is unable to comply with the standard on its effective date 
because of the unavailability of professional or technical workers, the unavail-
ability of needed materials and equipment, or necessary construction to the 
facility cannot be completed in time; (2) the employer is taking steps to protect 
employees against the hazards protected by the standard at issue; and (3) the 
employer will comply with the standard as soon as practicable.168  Employees 
must have notice of an employer’s application for a temporary variance, which 
may last for a maximum of two years.169 
A permanent variance, on the other hand, is appropriate where an em-
ployer convinces OSHA that it has an alternative method to ensure the same 
level of workplace safety or health as the standard at issue.170  Permanent var-
iances must describe the alternative method of safety or health that is proposed 
and may be modified or revoked at any point once six months have elapsed 
since their issuance.171 
Although a permanent variance is not a preemption concept, it does allow 
for employers’ flexibility when dealing with OSHA field preemption.172  The 
variance process thus provides a manner in which to adjust the level of feder-
alism, yet another way that OSHA provides a hybrid preemption approach. 
  
 
 165. 29 U.S.C. § 655(d) (2018). 
 166. Id. 
 167. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(6)(A)–(C) 
 168. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(6)(A). 
 169. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a). 
 170. 29 U.S.C. § 655(d). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See id. (giving employers six months to see their change implemented). 
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D. State Pre-Approved OSHA Plans 
As alluded to above, the OSH Act also permits states to develop their own 
plans and submit them for approval to OSHA.173  First, Section 18(a) provides 
that the Act does not “prevent any State agency or court from asserting juris-
diction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with re-
spect to which no standard is in effect.”174  This is implied conflict preemp-
tion.175  Second, and according to the Court in Gade, “Congress not only 
reserved certain areas to state regulation, but it also, in § 18(b) of the Act, gave 
the States the option of pre-empting federal regulation entirely,”176 or gave the 
states the opportunity to opt into a type of field preemption.177 
Twenty-seven states have taken advantage of the Section 18(b) option, at 
least to some extent, and have plans approved by OSHA.178  OSHA will grant 
permission to the state if it finds, among other things, that the plan: (1) desig-
nates a state agency to administer it, (2) provides for standards and inspections 
as effective as federal standards, (3) gives adequate funding and legal author-
ity to administer the plan, and (4) mandates that employers provide the Sec-
retary the same type of reports that would be required if no state plan were in 
place.179 
While these state-approved plans must be “at least as effective”180 as the 
federal OSH Act, some states, like California and Virginia, have been more 
 
 173. See id.; 29 U.S.C. § 667(b)–(c). 
 174. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a).  This seems to contemplate that the federal general duty clause and state 
safety and health regulation can coexist in appropriate circumstances.  See Ramsey Winch Inc. v. 
Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding general duty clause did not preempt Oklahoma 
laws holding employers criminally liable for prohibiting their employees from storing firearms in their 
personal vehicles on company property). 
 175. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(a). 
 176. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 97 (1992).  Section 667(b) reads: 
Submission of State plan for development and enforcement of State standards to preempt 
applicable Federal standards.  Any State which, at any time, desires to assume responsibil-
ity for development and enforcement therein of occupational safety and health standards 
relating to any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal standard 
has been promulgated [by the Secretary under the OSH Act] shall submit a State plan for 
the development of such standards and their enforcement. 
Id. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See, e.g., State Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2019). 
 179. 29 U.S.C. § 667(c). 
 180. 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2). 
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aggressive in regulation and have regulated areas that the federal OSH Act 
has regulated more minimally.181  In any event, and as the Henry court made 
clear, “when a state submits a state plan on a health and safety issue, the state 
takes responsibility only for the ‘Federal standard’ on that issue, not all federal 
standards.”182  Consider the example of the treatment of second-hand smoke 
in this regard.183  The OSHA Air Contaminants standard does not address sec-
ond-hand tobacco smoke.  Consequently, a state law regulating workplace 
smoking was not found to be preempted by OSHA.184 
V. OSHA HYBRID FEDERALISM AND THE RIGHT TO DISCONNECT 
Having set out the characteristics of both the OSHA statutory structure 
and its unique preemption provisions, this Article maintains the right to dis-
connect can be addressed best by a joint federal general duty clause approach, 
combined with state OSHA plans as a way to address the employee discon-
nection problem in the short-term.  The long-term hope is that OSHA will 
soon begin the process of promulgating a federal permanent standard which 
will make general duty enforcement unnecessary and allow the state OSHA 
plans to play a more complementary role.  This part uses the example of work-
place violence to illustrate how the hybrid federalism model can be utilized 
under OSHA and pre-approved state plans to address the safety and health 
issues surrounding employees’ right to disconnect. 
A. The Right to Disconnect and the General Duty Clause 
In examining the relationship between the right to disconnect and OSHA, 
it is necessary to start with the proposition that no current specific standards 
exist under the OSH Act that address the scope or timing of workplace related 
electronic communications between employers and employees after work.185  
Consequently, the only federal OSHA response possible in the disconnection 
area would be through the general duty clause.  In turn, a general duty clause 
 
 181. See sources cited supra note 52. 
 182. Indus. Truck Ass’n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 183. See, e.g., Empire Rest. & Tavern Ass’n v. State, 360 F. Supp. 2d 454, 464 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(using second-hand smoke as an example). 
 184. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 59 (2018) (citing Empire, 
360 F. Supp. 2d 454). 
 185. See Secunda, supra note 3, at 32. 
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violation would require that the inability to disconnect from the workplace is 
a “recognized hazard”186 causing “death or serious physical harm”187 to em-
ployees that could be feasibly abated through plausible alternative methods.188 
Although it is possible that employees stressed out and physically sick 
from the constant strain of receiving workplace communications after-hours 
might file a complaint with OSHA on their own, presently there is no indica-
tion that any such complaint has ever been filed with OSHA.  Consequently, 
it would be helpful, through its own publications, to make the lack of em-
ployee disconnection from the workplace a “recognized hazard” by highlight-
ing for employers and employees the dangers to safety and health caused by 
overwork and the inability to disconnect from the workplace.189  Here, an 
analogous example exists with regard to how OSHA has approached the 
workplace violence problem by using the general duty clause.190 
As with the right to disconnect, OSHA has chosen not to enact specific 
standards on workplace violence.191  Instead, OSHA has put out publications 
to assist its regional offices to bring general duty clause claims where work-
place violence has led to substantial injury or death.192  In a previous article I 
discussed how such a general duty clause regime might work in the right to 
disconnect context.  My purpose here is not to re-state that proposal, but to 
illustrate how the unique brand of hybrid federalism under OSHA can be 
 
 186. See Secunda, supra note 3, at 34 (“[W]ith a disconnection problem leading to substantial men-
tal or physical health concerns because of the amount and frequency of work the employees are being 
required to do after the workday, it would seem that an employer policy of not contacting workers 
through electronic communications, except in unusual or emergency situations, would go towards 
whether a hazard in fact existed at the worksite, whether the hazard was recognized by the employer, 
and whether there were feasible means of abatement.”). 
 187. Id. (“As far as injuries that could be caused, overwork stemming from excessive electronic 
communication requests can cause death, including suicide or cardiac arrest . . . , or serious bodily 
harm, in the form of extreme stress, depression, and anxiety that functionally debilitate the individ-
ual.”). 
 188. Id. (“On the factor of feasibility, such a hazard is preventable with proper training of supervi-
sors not to contact employees by text, e-mails or social media after work in normal circumstances.”). 
 189. See e.g., id. at 4 n.19 (noting that overwork and stress has led to increased workplace suicides 
in the United States in recent years). 
 190. See generally U.S. Department of Labor, OSHA Instruction CPL 02-01-058, Enforcement Pro-
cedures and Scheduling for Occupational Exposure to Workplace Violence (2017), https://www.osha 
.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/CPL_02-01-058.pdf [hereinafter OSHA Enforcement Procedures]. 
 191. See Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Because the absence 
of any specific OSHA standard on workplace violence is undisputed, the district court correctly rec-
ognized that the only possible area of OSH Act preemption was under the general duty clause and the 
OSH Act’s overarching purpose.”). 
 192. See, e.g., OSHA ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES, supra note 190. 
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utilized to promote federal-state cooperation in addressing this relatively new 
workplace danger. 
As described in The Employee Right to Disconnect, OSHA has published 
an “OSHA Instruction” on workplace violence that indicates that OSHA “in-
spectors should . . . gather evidence to demonstrate whether an employer rec-
ognized, either individually or through its industry, the existence of a potential 
workplace violence hazard affecting his or her employees.”193  Needless to 
say, OSHA should put out a similar directive with regard to the hazards sur-
rounding the inability of workers to disconnect from work because of repeated 
after-work communications from their employers.194  Whereas workplace vi-
olence is an obvious hazard that has been established to lead to both death or 
serious physical harm,195 the hazards surrounding the lack of rest, leisure, pri-
vacy, and autonomy for workers are far more insidious.  It is harder to make 
a causal connection between lack of disconnection stresses and injuries and 
sickness.  Instead, the perils of overwork caused by the inescapable nature of 
work must be brought more forcefully to employers’ and employees’ attention 
through anecdotes like the one this article started with regarding Tesla, with 
statistics regarding missed days or work and falling productivity, and with 
examples of how other countries—similar in nature to the United States—
have dealt with this same disconnection problem.196 
From a federalism or preemption standpoint, the good news is that an 
OSHA instruction, which makes it more likely for these disconnection issues 
to be identified and managed through the general duty clause, does not pre-
clude those states that already have OSHA plans to take more aggressive ac-
tion.  A number of courts have already found that general duty clause regula-
tion does not occupy the field of regulations when it comes to pre-approved 
 
 193. See id. at 3–4. 
 194. See, e.g., Yoav Gonen & Ruth Brown, Behind the Push to Let Employees Unplug Outside 
Normal Workday, N.Y. POST (Jan. 13, 2019, 11:19 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/01/13/behind-the-
push-to-let-employees-unplug-outside-normal-workday/. 
 195. But see Ramsey Winch Inc., 555 F.3d at 1206 (“In fact, OSHA declined a request to promulgate 
a standard banning firearms from the workplace.  In declining this request, OSHA stressed reliance on 
its voluntary guidelines and deference ‘to other federal, state, and local law-enforcement agencies to 
regulate workplace homicides.’” (quoting Letter from Richard E. Fairfax, Director, Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, to Morgan Melekos (September 13, 2006), available at 2006 WL 
4093048)). 
 196. In The Employee Right to Disconnect, I discussed in detail the regulatory approach taken by 
France and the self-regulatory approach taken by Germany to the right to disconnect.  See Secunda, 
supra note 3, at 27–32. 
[Vol. 46: 873, 2019] Hybrid Federalism and the Employee Right to Disconnect 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
900 
state plans under Section 18(b) of OSHA.197  Indeed, in the area of workplace 
violence, even with the increased regulation of workplace violence through 
the general duty clause based on the OSHA Instruction, states like California 
continue to push the envelope on what can be further done to address the issue 
of workplace violence.198  Thus, the argument here is that an OSHA Instruc-
tion on the hazards associated with overwork and the inability to disconnect 
would not in any way preempt California or other states to act like laboratories 
of experimentation (consistent with notions of federalism) and come up with 
their own responses to the disconnection problem.199 
B. The Right to Disconnect and State OSHA Plans 
In an environment where the general duty clause is the main source of 
regulation, it is incumbent upon states with pre-approved OSHA plans not just 
to mimic the federal standards, but also to consider additional standards to 
make the workplace safer and healthier for its employees.200  The way in 
which workplace violence issues have been dealt with by CalOSHA provides 
a useful jumping off point to consider how states could take the lead in the 
disconnection realm.201 
As discussed in The Employee Right to Disconnect,202 under its Work-
place Violence Regulations for Medical Care Providers, effective April 1, 
2017,203 CalOSHA has required that “healthcare employers implement violent 
incident logs and record violent incidents in the log.”204  Moreover, effective 
April 1, 2018, covered California employers must have implemented a work-
place violence prevention plan, reviewed the workplace violence prevention 
 
 197. See Ramsey Winch Inc., 555 F.3d at 1202 (holding general duty clause did not preempt Okla-
homa laws holding employers criminally liable for prohibiting their employees from storing firearms 
in their personal vehicles on company property). 
 198. See supra Sections IV.B., IV.D. 
 199. See Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Law Preemption Doc-
trine to Allow the States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L. REV. 97, 97, 100–01 (2009) 
(discussing using state employment initiatives to promote “the needed new thinking, experimentation, 
and flexibility [that] will most likely arise from a less centralized labor relations system”). 
 200. See, e.g., Secunda, supra note 3, at 36 (explaining the plan that California implemented that 
went beyond the General Duty Clause to help make the workplace safer). 
 201, See id. at 35. 
 202. See id. at 36. 
 203. CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 8, § 3342 (2017). 
 204. Secunda, supra note 3, at 38; CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 8, § 3342(d). 
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plan, and implemented training provisions for this plan for employees.205 
Needless to say, similar proposals could be implemented by states with 
regard to employees’ right to disconnect.  Logs could be required if sickness 
or injury could be tied to overwork based on after-work communications, and 
employers could be required to include in their employee handbooks re-
strictions, and exceptions to those restrictions, on when employees can be 
contacted after work by electronic communications.206  Moreover, managers, 
supervisors, and employees would all be trained on disconnection policies so 
all involved would be more sensitive to the unwanted consequences of such 
communication and when the benefits of such communications outweigh their 
costs in certain industries or at certain times.207 
As with any OSHA state plan, the advantage of first utilizing state plans 
is that such plans may be “(1) better adapted to local needs; (2) more efficient; 
(3) more fairly enforced; and (4) more in keeping with traditional state regu-
lation of safety and health matters.”208  It also seems that states, like Califor-
nia, that take workplace safety and health matters more seriously, have state 
plans that have more and better qualified personnel, more inspections, better 
legislative support, and more funding and resources.209 
C. The Future of OSHA Regulation of the Right to Disconnect 
Although the hybrid federalism of OSHA permits an initial regulatory re-
sponse to the employee disconnection problem through the use of the general 
duty clause and state initiatives, I have previously concluded that a number of 
pressing questions remain unanswered and that: 
each of these questions suggests that a General Duty Clause claim 
 
 205. CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 8, § 3342(c), (e), (f). 
 206. See Secunda, supra note 3, at 37. 
 207. See id. at 36 (“[I]t appears from the workplace violence directives and regulations that it is 
important for employers to know the risk factors for excessively communicating with workers outside 
work hours.”). 
 208. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 184, at 42. 
 209. See Marion McKnight, What are the Differences Between Federal vs. State OSHA Regula-
tions?, PHP SYSTEMS/DESIGNS (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.phsd.com/blog/what-are-the-differences-
between-federal-vs.-state-osha-regulations (explaining that some state programs are even stricter than 
federal regulations); Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), INC., https://www.inc 
.com/encyclopedia/occupational-safety-and-health-administration-osha.html (last visited Mar. 4, 
2019) (noting that state plans must include appropriate legislation, qualified personnel and inspectors, 
and appropriate regulations and procedures). 
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alone will be insufficient long term to guard against safety and health 
concerns associated with after-work electronic communications, and 
that it will eventually be necessary for OSHA to consider promulgat-
ing a permanent standard on contacting workers electronically out-
side working hours.210 
Not only does it make sense to have a permanent standard on workplace 
disconnection issues, but once an appropriate model of regulation is con-
ceived, a single, national, uniform standard would promote predictability, uni-
formity, and consistency with how employees would be treated throughout 
the country.211  For instance, and as discussed in The Employee Right to Dis-
connect: 
[a]though implementing a zero-tolerance policy, as is done with 
workplace violence, makes little sense in the disconnection context, 
employers could, nevertheless, develop and implement a well-written 
after-work electronic communication prevention program and put 
into place administrative controls, such as analysis of after-work 
communication practices, training on how to avoid such after-work 
requests, and create reports of policy violations.212 
Regardless, because of the newness of this area of the law and the broad, ex-
press preemptive effect that such a specific standard would have under 
OSHA’s statutory scheme, it would be important to learn lessons from state 
OSHA plans, like California’s, to provide an effective regulatory model from 
 
 210. See Secunda, supra note 3, at 34–35.  Those questions include: 
[W]hat if the employer, like most employers these days, does not have a policy on after 
work electronic communications?  Can it be said that the hazard is recognized in those cir-
cumstances?  Additionally, what if electronic communications cause annoyances, stress, 
and inconveniences, but are not likely to cause death or serious harm?  And finally, what 
if certain types of industries, by their very nature, require employees to be on call or to be 
in contact often after work with their employer? 
Id. at 34. 
 211. See generally George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions 
from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 335 (1987) (noting that OSHA re-
quired a single definition of “employer” so that it was uniform throughout all of the states). 
 212. See Secunda, supra note 3, at 37 n.307 (“Engineering controls for workplace violence preven-
tion, including alarm systems, panic buttons, metal detectors, mirrors, locks, and lighting, make less 
sense in the disconnection context.  That being said, smartphone and other computer technologies 
could be utilized to keep track of how often employers are requesting, and employees are receiving, 
after work requests by texts, e-mail, or social media.”). 
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which to work.213 
It is also important to keep in mind that even with broad field preemption 
of an eventual disconnection standard, OSHA would provide another form of 
hybrid federalism by permitting flexibility for employers who can prove 
through the OSHA permanent variance process that they have come up with 
an equally effective model to protect their employees from the dangers of 
overwork associated with after-work electronic communications.214  Through 
the variance process, the harshness of the field preemption approach can be 
militated against and allow employers to have contact with their employees 
after hours based on industry demands or the global nature of their busi-
nesses.215 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The hybrid federalism of OSHA is perfectly suited to address the privacy 
issues that derive from employees’ inability to disconnect from the workplace 
because of increasing employer reliance on keeping employees tied to the 
workplace through smartphones, laptops, and other technological advances.  
Hybrid federalism is based on either a strong express preemption or implied 
field preemption on the one hand, combined with a complementary role for 
states to play in areas of implied conflict preemption or where no federal rule 
exists at all. 
With regard to implementing right to disconnect regulations under 
OSHA, the hybrid federalism approach proposed here would start with strong 
federal enforcement through OSHA’s general duty clause combined with 
more specific requirements under a number of state OSHA plans.  Eventually, 
 
 213. See id. at 32 (noting that disconnection safety should be proposed “based on the template es-
tablished by both OSHA and . . . CALOSHA, with regard to the somewhat related phenomenon of 
workplace violence”). 
 214. OSHA’s Variance Program, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.osha.gov/dts/otpca/variances/ 
(follow “Types of Variances”) (last visited Mar. 4, 2019) (“A permanent variance authorizes the em-
ployer(s) to use an alternative means to comply with the requirements of a standard when they can 
prove that their proposed methods, conditions, practices, operations, or processes provide workplaces 
that are at least as safe and healthful as the workplaces provided by the OSHA standards from which 
they are seeking the permanent variance.”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1905.11 (2018) (setting out regulatory 
requirements for obtaining permanent variance). 
 215. See Secunda, supra note 3, at 37.  On the other hand, OSHA could target industries where 
employees’ right to disconnect historically have been disregarded.  See id. at 37 (“Disconnection pol-
icies could also be especially targeted for industries where after-work communication tends to be more 
frequent, such as healthcare, legal, and many retail positions.”). 
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the hope would be that OSHA would promulgate a permanent disconnection 
standard mostly occupying the field of regulation, but still permitting states to 
provide even more generous protections under pre-approved State plans not 
preempted by the federal standard.  In this way, not only can employees re-
claim a modicum of privacy, autonomy, rest, and leisure, but also ensure that 
their work is the safest and healthiest it can be by being able to disconnect 
from it when appropriate and necessary.216 
 
 216. See 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (noting that Section 3(8) of OSHA defines a safety and health work-
place as one “necessary [and] appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of em-
ployment”).  This requires OSHA to establish that a permanent standard benefits employees’ health 
and safety.  See Secunda, supra note 3, at 19.  I borrow the “necessary [and] appropriate” language to 
provide a guidepost for the proposed OSHA standard to meet in thinking about a future right to dis-
connect standard. 
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